An analysis of impediments to the productivity enhancing capital investment programs at the Naval Air Station, Alameda and the Naval Air Rework Facility, Alameda, California. by Badger, Carlos S.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1985
An analysis of impediments to the productivity
enhancing capital investment programs at the Naval
Air Station, Alameda and the Naval Air Rework
Facility, Alameda, California.
Badger, Carlos S.











AN ANALYSIS OF IMPEDIMENTS TO THE PRODUCTIVITY
ENHANCING CAPITAL INVESTMENT PROGRAMS AT THE
NAVAL AIR STATION, ALAMEDA AND THE NAVAL AIR








Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
22k







i. DECLASSIFICATION /DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
3 DISTRIBUTION /AVAILABILITY OF REPORT
Approved for public release;
distribution unlimited
PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) 5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)





7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION
Naval Postgraduate School
ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)
Monterey, California 93943-5100
7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)
Monterey, California 93942-5100




9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER









TITLE (Include Security Classification)
AN ANALYSIS OF IMPEDIMENTS TO THE PRODUCTIVITY ENHANCING CAPITAL INVESTMENT PROGRAMS AT THE
NAVAL AIR STATION, ALAMEDA AND THE NAVAL AIR REWORK FACILITY, ALAMEDA, CALIFORNIA
PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)
Badger, Carlos S.











18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
Impediments to productivity Management Control
Productivity Enhancement Productivity Programs
Capital Investment
ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
This thesis evaluates the impediments to the productivity enhancing capital
investment programs to two Naval Activities, Naval Air Station Alameda, and Naval Air
Rework Facility, Alameda, California. The analysis uses a management control per-
spective. Particular issues addressed are what productivity programs are currently
being used and why some programs are not yet fully functioning. In examining the
"
productivity programs it was found that certain barriers do exist that impede the full
utilization of these programs. The work concludes with the listing of these
impediments and recommendations for improving the programs.
0. DISTRIBUTION /AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT
£) UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED SAME AS RPT. Q DTIC USERS
21 ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED
>a NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL
Dan C. Boger




D FORM 1473, 84 mar 83 APR edition may be used until exhausted
All other editions are obsolete.
1
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE
UNCLASSIFIED
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
An Analysis of Impediments to the Productivity Enhancing
Capital Investment Programs at the Naval Air Station, Alameda
and the Naval Air Rework Facility, Alameda, California
by
Carlos S. Badger
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B.A., University of Washington, 1974
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of





This thesis evaluates the impediments to the productivity
enhancing capital investment programs to two Naval Activi-
ties, Naval Air Station Alameda, and Naval Air Rework Facil-
ity, Alameda, California. The analysis uses a management
control perspective. Particular issues addressed are what
productivity programs are currently being used and why some
programs are not yet fully functioning. In examining the
productivity programs it was found that certain barriers do
exist that impede the full utilization of these programs.
The work concludes with the listing of these impediments and
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
Productivity enhancement is an expanding area of interest
within the DoD and the government as a whole [Ref. 1: pp.
190], Managers are increasingly being held accountable for
coordinating the economic resources under their control in
order to ensure their most efficient and effective use. In
an effort to get the most productivity out of defense budget
dollars, a more complete understanding of the total amount of
needed capital investment expenditures is required. Deter-
mining how productivity programs are implemented by manage-
ment through management control systems and the impediments
to productivity that follow, can provide insight into how
managers are motivated to seek or not to seek improved
productivity through capital investment.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1 . Primary Research Question
What are the impediments to productivity enhancing
capital investment programs at Naval Air Station Alameda and
Naval Air Rework Facility Alameda?
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2. Subsidiary Research Question
What is the structure and process of the management
control system for capital investment at Naval Air Station
Alameda and Naval Air Rework Facility Alameda?
C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research effort for this thesis relies primarily on
three data sources. The first is a comprehensive review of
available published literature on management control and
productivity related topics in the form of books, periodi-
cals, reports, and information obtained from the Defense
Logistics Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE). The second
method is personal interviews. These interviews were con-
ducted on a one-on-one basis with personnel at different
levels of management at NAS and NARF Alameda. Common to each
interview was a standard questionnaire that was responded to
orally by interviewees. The third data source is information
gathered from archival data (e.g., instructions, memos) at
each of the activities. This helped substantiate responses
given by those interviewed and provided insight to guidelines
established for each particular activity.
D. SCOPE OF THE STUDY
The overall scope of this research effort was to provide
an analysis from a management control system perspective of
the productivity programs presently in effect at NAS and NARF
Alameda. This analysis includes a description of both the
structure and process of the management control systems and
the impediments to productivity found at the two activities.
E. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
Given that this thesis focuses on productivity and capi-
tal investment issues, factors that are considered part of a
manager's performance evaluation, it is understandable that
interviews were somewhat guarded and non-attributable. The
researcher attempted to get managers to be as open as possi-
ble and focus on concrete impediments that could be docu-
mented as opposed to everyday gripes.
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
Chapter II provides a background of the DoD Productivity
Program and the DON Productivity Improvement Program. Chap-
ter III discusses the management control system (MCS) at NAS
Alameda. A brief review of manangement control theory is
also incorporated. Impediments to productivity at NAS
Alameda is the subject of Chapter IV. Each phase of the
management control system is evaluated for possible barriers
that exist. In Chapter V, a brief profile of the recently
implemented (FY 83) Asset Capitalization Program (ACP) at
industrial funded activities is presented. This is followed
by an analysis of the management contnrol system at NARF
Alameda as it functions within ACP. Productivity impediments
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as they relate to each phase of the management control system
at NARF Alameda are elaborated upon in Chapter VI. The study




From the early 1900' s when the work of Frederick W.
Taylor, a pioneer in the methods of scientific management,
was applied to efforts in our Navy shipyards, the government
has sought to improve productivity in our defense resources
[Ref. 2: pp. 5]. Since that time, many efforts at produc-
tivity improvements have begun, but in recent years,
particularly the last decade, the need for productivity
enhancement through capital investment has come to the
forefront in government and defense planning. This chapter
briefly addresses the events that have renewed our govern-
ment's concern in this area and also discusses current pro-
grams that have been established in reaction to this concern.
This background should provide a better understanding of the
efforts, discussed in later chapters, of organizations at the
lowest level within the Department of the Navy to comply with
government directives for productivity improvement through
capital investment.
B. A NATIONAL CONCERN
Productivity is increasingly purported to be one of our
critical national concerns. The House Committee on Armed
Services has stated that even though the United States has
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traditionally led the world in productivity, the United
States is now last in productivity improvements among all
industrialized nations [Ref. 3:pp. 16]. In fact, it is noted
that the United States' continuing lead in productivity today
stems from technological advancements and capital investments
established in the 1950 's and 60 ' s [Ref. l:pp. 190]. For
example, a 1980 survey of metal cutting and forming equipment
at DoD maintenance activities inducated that 60 percent of
that machinery was at least two decades old [Ref. 4:pp. 19].
A serious downward trend during the 1970' s in the rate of
investment in productivity-enhancing modernization, particu-
larly in defense-supporting industries, is also well docu-
mented [Ref. l:pp. 190] and further aggregates the dilemma.
The figures point to the fact that while our labor force
productivity increased at the average annual rate of about 3
percent during the first two decades following WWII, during
the 1970' s it slowed markedly to about half that, or 1.5
percent a year [Ref. 5:pp 70]. During the same 10 year
period, the productivity of Germany, Japan, and some other
industralized nations improved at rates of from 6 to 14
percent each year [Ref. 5:pp. 70]. The national defense
implications for this deteriorating situation are a cause for
concern.
In order to combat this slowdown and improve the annual
rate of productivity, the government's most recent actions
began in 1975 with the formation of the National Center for
13
Productivity and Quality of Working Life. The objectives of
this center were in part to recommend ways of improving the
rate of capital investments, stimulate and develop more
effective approaches to improving productivity in the public
sector, and coordinate the productivity-enhancing efforts of
all Federal agencies [Ref. 5:pp. ii]. It was in response to
required reports directed by this agency that DoD issued its
own directive establishing its latest productivity program in
August, 1975 [Ref. 6:pp. 10].
C. DoD PRODUCTIVITY PROGRAM
The DoD Productivity Program (DPP) was established with
the issuance of DoD Directive 5010.31 in August of 1975. It
was later updated in April of 1979. The three major aspects
of the program were productivity enhancement, measurement,
and evaluation [Ref. 4:pp. 20]. With these three elements in
mind, DoD policy under the new program was to focus manage-
ment attention on aggressively seeking out opportunities for
improved methods of operation that would achieve maximum
Defense outputs from available resource inputs. Any savings
brought about by productivity enhancement would be reapplied,
as much as practical, to the lowest organizational level as
an incentive for management. It further provided that the DPP
to be developed would include:
(1) Productivity goals which would be made an integral
part of the PPBS as well as resources to help achieve
such goals;
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(2) A planned approach to productivity enhancement
including;
(a) Continuing analysis, performance appraisal, and
improvement of all operating methods and systems,
(b) Effective use of work measurement, statistical
techniques to determine workforce efficiency, and
development of data bases to support integration
into PPBS,
(c) Productivity Enhancement Capital Investment
Program development,
(d) Analysis of productivity enhancement alternatives
in accordance with DoDI 7041.3, and
(e) Improvement through management efforts of
workforce motivation and quality of working life.
[Ref. 6:pp. 12-13]
The overall responsibility for implementing the program
rests with the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Manpower,
Reserve Affairs, and Logistics (ASD (MRA&L)). It is further
delegated through a designated DoD Productivity Principal
under ASD (MRA&L). The duties of that office include:
(1) Overall DPP technical guidance,
(2) Monitoring and coordinating productivity improvements
within DoD,
(3) Providing productivity data to other elements of the
Federal government,
(4) Providing DPP-related training curriculum guidance,
and
(5) Representing DoD in joint Federal government
productivity enhancement efforts.
Additionally, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comp-
troller) was to ensure that all DPP efforts were appropri-
ately integrated into current DoD resource management
15
systems. This would provide a means of accumulating pro-
ductivity data and maintain economic analysis policy
guidance. [Ref. 6:pp. 12]
Amplification of DoDD 5010.31 can be found in companion
instructions DoDI 5010.34 and 5010.36. The 5010.34 instruc-
tions on the three major elements of the DPP; productivity
enhancement, measurement, and evaluation. The 5010.36
establishes policy and prescribes procedures for the DoD
Productivity Enhancing Capital Investment Program. Its
objectives include:
(1) Improve the efficiency and effectiveness of defense
organizations and activities by encouraging the appli-
cation of capital equipment and facilities to improve
methods of operation.
(2) Increase the level of consciousness among defense man-
agers of the potential for productivity improvement
through capital investments.
(3) Promote the substitution of capital for labor as a
means of optimizing the output of the defense work
force.
Under the DoD instructions each component of DoD was re-
quired to implement its own productivity program in support
of overall defense and government initiatives. The programs
were to contain at least the following:
(1) Priority emphasis on productivity enhancement,
(2) Maximum use of existing resource management systems,
(3) Methods improvement and labor performance standards
use when appropriate,
(4) Effective capital investment planning,
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(5) Development and use of productivity evaluation
indicators,
(6) Accumulation of productivity data,
(7) Utilization of productivity and performance data in
manpower requirements development,
(8) Optimum effective use of standard time data,
(9) Adequate staffing of the aproductivity program,
(10) Periodic field reviews, and
(11) Productivity measurement and evaluation. [Ref. 6:pp.
13]
D. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM
Though criticized for being slow to get on line with a
viable productivity program in comparison to the Army and Air
Force [Ref. 7:pp. i], the Navy's current program promulgated
in a Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) Instruction 522. 31A in
June of 1981 establishes six program objectives to meet
productivity enhancement needs in the Navy. These include:
(1) Elevate visibility of productivity as an essential
dimension of management within the Department of the
Navy ( DON )
;
(2) Develop productivity enhancement initiatives as a
means to achieve the highest possible level of readi-
ness within available resources;
(3) To stimulate managers, at all levels of organizations,
to focus on the underlying mission of their organiza-
tions, to develop valid measures of output, and
explore methodologies to improve organization
performance;
(4) To create a climate which will lead to the implementa-
tion of a well organized and economically sould pro-
ductivity enhancing capital investment program;
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(5) To enhance the Quality of Working Life of the Navy's
military and civilian workforce through the estab-
lishment of meaningful incentives and the elimination
of disincentives to productivity: and
(6) Foster the utilization of productivity data in pro-
gram, budget, and performance evaluation.
The DON's policies under 5200. 31A are similar to those
established by DoD including the provision that savings which
are derived from productivity enhancing initiatives would be,
as much as practical, reapplied or used by the same activity
accruing the savings.
Responsibilities for implementing the DON Productivity
Program also corresponds to the DPP with DON counterparts of
DoD fulfilling the same roles with much the same duties,
(i.e., the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, (Shipbuilding and
Logistics) has overall responsibility for the program). It
is, however, the responsibility of all organizations within
DON to take the following actions:
(1) Take appropriate steps to promote productivity en-
hancement, measurement, and evaluation as an integral
element of applicable management systems. The improve-
ment of productivity is an inherent and continuing
responsibility of all managers.
(2) Develop and promulgate specific guidelines to subord-
inate commands to facilitate uniform and, to the
extent practical, comprehensive productivity reporting
at the individual major claimant or command level. In
developing these guidelines, maximum use will be made
of existing resource management systems.
(3) Initiate action necessary to expand productivity mea-
surement coverage to progressively encompass all sus-
ceptible support type and other functions.
(4) Take appropriate steps to extend the identification of
valid output indicators.
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(5) Ensure that a valid payback analysis data system and
cost/benefit data base and analysis system are in
place where productivity enhancing capital investment
decisions are applicable.
In summary, this chapter has provided a background of the
goals and strategy of the DoD and DON productivity programs.
The major task of implementing strategy is to create a fit
between the organization's goals and its other activities.
Generally, these other activities include functional poli-
cies, the organization structure, processes, information
systems, incentive systems, control systems, management
selection and development, and leadership style. [Ref. 8:pp.
33] The following chapters will discuss the fit between the
DON's goals to improve productivity through capital invest-
ment and the management control systems at Naval Air Station
Alameda and Naval Air Rework Facility Alameda.
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III. MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEM: NAS ALAMEDA
A. INTRODUCTION
The objectives of the Navy's productivity program are
discussed in the previous chapter and represent the result of
strategic planning to set goals for the Navy and various
strategies to attain those goals. The strategies developed
include both policies and broad programs of activities. When
these decisions have been reached, though they may be re-
examined continuously, management needs some way to assure
that people in the organization do what they are supposed to
do. Management control is the process by which managers
assure that resources are obtained and used effectively and
efficiently in the accomplishment of an organization's
objectives. [Ref. 9:pp. 1] The system used to collect and
analyze information, evaluate it, and use it and other de-
vices to control activities is a management control system.
[Ref. 10:pp. 4-5]
As is the case with any system within an organization, a
management control system can be described in terms of: (a)
its structure, and (b) its process; that is, what it is, and
what it does [Ref. 9:pp. 21]. This chapter describes the
management control system at NAS Alameda as it relates to
promoting and obtaining funds for productivity improvements
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through capital investment, an intrinsic element of the
Navy's productivity program.
B. STRUCTURE
Management control structure at NAS Alameda is primarily
a responsibility structure. Under this type of structure the
principal method of classifying data and management informa-
tion is by responsibility centers. There are three types of
responsibility centers: (1) cost centers, (2) revenue cen-
ters, and (3) investment centers. Information classified in
this way is used for: (1) planning the activities of respon-
sibility centers, (2) coordinating the work of the several
responsibility centers in an organization, and (3) control-
ling the responsibility center manager. Responsibility costs
are those incurred by or in behalf of a responsibility cen-
ter. The total resources consumed by a responsibility center
for a period of time, when measured in monetary terms, are
the costs of that responsibility center. [Ref. 9:pp. 21-22,
26]
NAS Alameda is a fifth echelon command whose chain of
command is shown in Figure A-l. The organization structure
of NAS Alameda is depicted in Figure A-2. Ultimate respon-
sibility for all programs, including productivity enhance-
ment through capital investment, rests with the commanding
officer,. However, this responsibility is delegated to the
department heads and special assistants who act as cost
21
center managers [Ref. ll:pp. 1]. Though each of these cost
center managers answers directly to the commanding officer,
all data collected for analysis are indirectly supplied to
the commanding officer through the comptroller's department.
This information, when received by the comptroller, is re-
viewed for validity and listed for comparison with the other
departments. Though productivity information and enhancement
is a common concern shared by each of the departments, there




The management control process has two dimensions: (1)
informal, and (2) formal. The informal management control
process involves interaction among managers and workers as
memos, meetings, conversations, and even such signals as
facial expressions. The formal process in a management
control system can be depicted as a closed loop, four phase
process that recurs in a regular cycle as shown in Figure 1.
[Ref. 10:pp. 26-27] This four phase process can also be used
to describe the management control system at NAS Alameda.
1 . Program Selection
Productivity initiatives which deal with capital
investment can originate at any level of the organization.
These initiatives are generally passed up the chain of com-











Phases of Management Control System
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this process that productivity initiatives get sponsored.
Managers up the chain of command must sponsor the project
and shepherd it successfully through the rigors of whatever
screening the department in question imposes. In fact the
rate of progress of a project up the hierarchy of management
through various stages of approval to final authorization and
acceptance depends on the impetus given the project. [Ref.
12:pp. 57-58] By the time the project or program has reached
the department head level it has gained some credibility
through this screening process and the program selection pro-
cess really begins. Programs that meet organizational goals
and strategies are then formalized for submissiion to the
commanding officer. These formal proposals are written to
conform with instructions and guidelines promulgated by DoD
and DON concerning equipment bought under funds entitled
Other Procurement Navy (OPN), both industrial plant equipment
(IPE) and equipment other than IPE. Each department submits
a prioritized list of all such proposals to the comptroller's
office for a final check for funding and regulation compli-
ance prior to the commanding officer's review. This list is
submitted annually in December/January time frame to comply
with the Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS) dead-
lines. Lists submitted in December of 1984 would be funding
requests for FY 87. [Ref. 12:pp. 1]
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2. Budgeting
Budgeting now becomes an important factor in the
program decision making. The commanding officer, normally
assisted by the comptroller, will consider budget restraints
and take into account planned increases and decreases in
budget. These predictions are passed down to NAS Alameda
from the major claimant (CLINCPACFLT) via the type commander
(COMNAVAIRPAC) . Though not done in the past, the comptroller
would at this time also recommend possible program funding
under PECl/PIF of certain programs that might qualify for
these funds. In the past, the type commander has reviewed
OPN requests and returned some programs in order that they be
used in seeking PECl/PIF funding.
Once departmental needs have been aggregated and bud-
getary restraints considered, the commanding officer submits
a consolidated, prioritized list to the major claimant via
the type commander with PPBS. From these funds NAS Alameda





Upon receipt of OPN dollars, the department heads and
special assistants (cost center managers) purchase intended
equipment and keep operating and measurement records of pro-
ductivity improvement due to the new equipment in their re-
spective centers. Should additional equipment be needed
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during the fiscal year to improve productivity or meet mis-
sion requirements, emergent OPN dollars are normally request-
ed. Emergent OPN dollars are OPN funds held on reserve at
the major claimant level for emergency OPN equipment pur-
chases. PECl/PIF funds which are available are seldom
requested for productivity initiatives of this nature. [Ref.
11: pp. 1]
4. Reporting and Analysis
The reporting and analysis of productivity enhance-
ment through capital investment is accomplished by the
departments sending cost and productivity data required by
appropriate DoD and DON instruction to the comptroller first,
then the commanding officer for review. It is then sent up
the chain of command via the type commander to the major
claimant. This is a requirement that has to be completed for
a specified period refered to as the payback period [Ref.
13:pp. 1-3]. After that, similar data are not kept. Reports
of equipment previously requested but not yet funded as well
as the equipment failing to meet productivity levels used to
justify its purchase are communicated and used for revision
of future budget requests and operations data. [Ref. ll:pp.
1]
Not incorporated in this four phase model, but also a
management tool for promoting increased productivity at NAS
Alameda and throughout the government, is the beneficial sug-
gestion program. Cash awards are given to both military and
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civilians who present ideas that improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of government operations. It should be noted
that these suggestions need not improve the awardees ' partic-
ular job per se, but only relate to their official duties.
The program is administered by one person appointed by the
commanding officer. It is the responsibility of all managers
to promote the program. Suggestions are evaluated for merit
by anyone determined to have sufficient expertise, including
a suggestor's supervisor or department head. These evalu-
ators determine the costs, benefits, and advisability of
adopting and implementing a beneficial suggestion. [Ref.
14:pp. 1-5]
In conclusion, meaningful strategies must be conceiv-
ed in operational terms, such as markets to reach, materials
to acquire, research to perform, and the like [Ref. 15:pp.
30], So it is with a productivity enhancement strategy. In
this chapter, both the structure and process of the manage-
ment control system at NAS Alameda have been described. This
management control system which promotes productivity and
obtains funds for productivity improvements through capital
investment has been established to follow directives set by
higher authority and function within the bounds of PPBS.
This action integrates the system with many aspects of the
DoD and DON productivity programs. However, such actions
take on value only as they contribute to the desired results.
It is now necessary to determine if there are any barriers
27
that impede the management control system to produce these
desired results.
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IV. IMPEDIMENTS TO THE PRODUCTIVITY PROGRAM
AT NAS ALAMEDA
A. INTRODUCTION
In Chapter III the productivity program at NAS Alameda is
discussed using a four phase MCS model. In this chapter this
same MCS model (i.e., program selection, budgeting, operating
and measurement, reporting and analysis) is used to evaluate
the possible areas where impediments may exist within the
productivity program at NAS Alameda.
B. PROGRAM SELECTION
Productivity initiatives for program selection can be
submitted from any level of management within a department.
These ideas are screened partially by supervisors as they are
routed up the department chain of command prior to being
formally submitted by the department to the comptroller for
budget submission. Those interviewed said they believed this
process was not restrictive as virtually all suggestions for
productivity enhancements were included in the departmental
budget submissions. Therefore, this screening process is
determined not to be a probable impediment to productivity.
One of the impediments to productivity during this phase
of MCS was a need for department training in the availability
of other funds for use in procuring equipment for productiv-
ity enhancement. The lack of requests for funds other than
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OPN from the various departments reflects this need. Depart-
ments are only required to submit lists of equipment needed
under OPN. In fact, except for the comptroller and two
budget analysts in the comptroller's office, programs such as
the PECI/PIF are virtually unknown to department planners.
Recently, one department did investigate and seek PECI funds
on its own initiative and received tentative approval. The
implication is that if more departments were trained to re-
cognize potential projects that would qualify for these
funds, utilization of the funds would increase.
The absence of a productivity committee poses another
possible impediment to productivity at NAS Alameda. The
burden of evaluating projects and prioritizing them for the
entire base is placed on the expertise of the commanding
officer, assisted by the comptroller. The department heads
have access to the commanding officer to advise him of the
merits of their own particular projects. However, it was
said by those interviewed that under the present system in
some cases "politics" played too great a role and it was the
"squeaky wheel that got the grease." In addition, it was
expressed by those interviewed that they did not know en-
tirely what capital investments were procured in other
departments or whether these procurements could be used to
improve productivity in their departments. Productivity
committees are established to coordinate and handle these
situations.
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Many times programs are adopted because they are dir-
ected by higher authority. An example would be a recent
procurement of a munitions loader. After an inspection by
the type commander's ( COMNAVAIRPAC ) safety and assistance
team, it was determined that the current munitions loader was
unsafe and posed a hazard to the weapons personnel. To com-
ply with a new directive, the new munitions loader became a
top priority. Additionally, an x-ray security screening
system for inspecting baggage at the air terminal was pur-
chased because of a manpower reduction of five baggage
inspectors. This manpower reduction, directed by higher
authority, literally forced the procurement of the x-ray
system, if the security of the air terminal was still to be
maintained. While these purchases certainly contribute to
the safety and efficiency of operations, they also demon-
strate how directives from higher authority affect the
decisions at the activity level. It may have been more
productive for NAS Alameda to have kept the five inspectors
and purchased a piece of equipment for another department
which would have produced greater cost savings. However, the
flexibility to do so has been removed by decisions from
higher authority.
C. BUDGETING
The adequacy of funding of OPN budgets has impeded the
use of other funding sources for capital investments. During
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the last four or five years under the current administration
the defense department has enjoyed budget increases not seen
in many years [Ref. 16], Because of this, it was expressed
by those persons interviewed that their current budget allo-
cations and funding were adequate and met most of their
department needs. The adequacy of their budgets perhaps con-
tributes to the lack of aggressiveness in seeking additional
funds from other sources, such as PECl/PIF, for programs
requested but not funded under OPN. Managers may honestly
fail to see the need for change from present budget strategy.
Another impediment is the false impression held by the
budget office that PECl/PIF program submission decisions were
under the direction of higher authority and not at local dis-
cretion. In the past, some programs for equipment that were
originally submitted up the chain of command during the an-
nual OPN requests were then returned to the originator with
instructions that they be resubmitted as PECl/PIF programs.
This is the case with the programs submitted by NAS Alameda
for PECl/PIF funding. They were originally submitted as OPN
requests, but were returned with instructions to resubmit as
PECl/PIF. For the last three years only one program per year
has been submitted. Prior to 1982 there were no recorded
submissions. Additionally, according to a memorandum from
COMNAVAIRPAC, for FY-1984 there were only 12 programs sub-
mitted for the entire U.S. Navy, of which only nine were
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funded [Ref. 17:pp. 1-3]. Because there are so few submis-
sions and the submissions on record at NAS Alameda were at
the suggestion of COMNAVAIRPAC , it was misleadingly under-
stood that PECl/PIF projects were the product of directives
from higher authority.
Lack of training of personnel submitting requests for
alternate methods of funding productivity enhancing capital
investments is another impediment found in this phase of the
MCS. When department lists of prioritized OPN requests were
received by the comptroller's office, they were then scrutin-
ized to determine if alternate funding, other than OPN, was
appropriate. Worksheets showed that some were reassigned
legitimately for funds available in such areas as morale,
welfare, and recreation, while others were separated into IPE
and other than IPE. However, none were selected for PECl/PIF
funding. Those interviewed said that part of the problem is
that personnel within the comptroller's office were not
familiar with the actual mechanics of submitting PECl/PIF
projects. Training and the use of the instruction regarding
PECl/PIF was almost nonexistent. Only one person in the
comptroller's office was familiar with the PECl/PIF instruc-
tion. This person had prepared the submission for the project
last year and was working jointly with a budget analyst from
another department for a project being submitted for FY 85.
However, she expressed apprehension in preparing PECl/PIF
submissions. She said last year's document preparation took
33
two months to complete. This year's PIF submission was
returned for clarification, additional information, so that
it could be brought into compliance with current regulations
[Ref. 18:pp. 1], Because of this difficulty, coupled with
the fact that the comptroller's office normally decides the
funding channels, it is understandable why past PECl/PIF
programs were submitted only when directed by higher
authority.
A by-product of this process of submitting first under
OPN and then resubmitting under alternate funding programs is
a time lag. Projects have a two to three year additional
time lag from program conception to actual funding and
procurement [Ref. 19].
D. OPERATING AND MEASUREMENT
One of the impediments found in this phase of MCS is
the loss of expertise due to the on-going problem of per-
sonnel turnover. Though they had been in their field of work
for several years, 80 percent of those interviewed had only
been in their present jobs for one year or less. This same
percentage said they felt they were just starting to get the
feel of their new positions and could consequently now
concern themselves more with productivity matters. Two to
three year personnel turnover in the military is a common
occurrence and often causes reliance on proven programs and
experience [Ref. 19]. New programs such as the PECl/PIF are
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often ignored until a convenient time when managers can
acquaint themselves with it. A convenient time, with the
normally burdensome workload of the managers, does not often
occur and consequently, some new programs get shelved within
the system [Ref. 19].
Another impediment is that offic equipment and some of
the high tech machines have very short useful lives. This
makes it difficult for managers to work within PPBS, that is,
request funds and receive them, and still have the useful
life that had been originally projected for the equipment.
NAS Alameda had at least one case where they bought two
pieces of office equipment which became obsolete within the
first two years of operation. The obsolescence precluded a
cost saving even though every attempt was made to generate a
reportable savings [Ref. 20:pp. 1].
E. REPORTING AND ANALYSIS
The absence of a productivity committee at NAS Alameda
can also be listed as an impediment during this final phase
of the MCS model.
Managers attend to items that they know are being measured,
particularly if they have to report to higher management on
those items. Because of the natural tendency to want to
"look good," meeting the goals of the reporting system can
be a goal in itself, even if meeting that goal acts to the
general detriment of the rest of the system. Supervisors
and managers cannot be expected to act counter to their own
interests . . . [Ref. 21:pp. 1]
The absence of a productivity committee at NAS Alameda
more readily provides the opportunity for departments to act
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individually rather than in a coordinated effort. Those
interviewed said a productivity committee would be beneficial
and feedback on productivity programs and equipment would be
improved.
In summary, while these are not all the possible impedi-
ments, barriers to productivity do exist within the MCS at
NAS Alameda. These impediments or barriers can and often do
hamper implementation of productivity programs. The success
of productivity programs such as PECl/PIF can be severely
restrained if these impediments are not overcome within the
system.
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V. MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEM: NARF ALAMEDA
A. INTRODUCTION
The Naval Air Rework Facility (NARF), Alameda is an
industrial fund activity. On 19 August 1981, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense approved the financing of equipment and
minor construction for industrial fund activities with indus-
trial fund resources [Ref. 22:pp. 1]. This meant that indus-
trial fund equipment would be acquired with industrial fund
revenues rather than direct appropriated funds. The effec-
tive date for the change was 1 October 1982. The program
established to implement this policy was the Asset Capitali-
zation Program (ACP). The program includes, but is not
limited to, investments in capital equipment, minor construc-
tion, and management systems development efforts. Under ACP,
equipment with unit acquisition costs of $1,000 or more and a
useful life of more than two years must be capitalized and
depreciated. This includes modification and upgrading that
would extend the useful life of the equipment by more than
two years or increase the equipment's work performance capa-
city and capabilities. Management systems development in-
cludes both the cost of acquisition and the development of
software which exceeds $100,000 and has a useful life of more
than two years. Equipment and management systems whose costs
and useful lives are outside these parameters are expensed in
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full, with some exceptions, during the current fiscal year.
Minor construction projects in support of industrial fund
operations which cost less than $100,000 are also included in
this program. Construction costing over $100,000 is funded
through Congressional appropriations. [Ref. 22:pp. 4]
Industrial fund activities receive their revenue to pur-
chase equipment from the stabilized rates they charge their
customers. These rates are based on projected costs includ-
ing depreciation on all capital investment items exclusive of
contributed real property, and accumulated operating results
(gain/loss) due to prior year operations to be distributed to
customers via a payback factor. Additionally, adjustments in
the form of reserves are held to assure sufficient cash to
meet operational requirments. Reserve amounts may be collect-
ed in the current year to help finance periodic or extraordi-
nary expenses of future years. The types of reserves to be
collected are capital equipment purchases, backlog of major
maintenance and repairs (real and plant property), minor con-
struction, cash level requirements (30 days average), manage-
ment software systems development efforts, and other (i.e.,
revenues required to finance high costs of dredging a channel
every five years may be collected over the preceding five
year period rather than in the year of dredging the channel).
The development of the stabilized rates include all these
factors as applicable. [Ref. 22:pp 5],
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With this brief and limited explanation of ACP as back-
ground, the balance of this chapter describes the control
system for productivity through capital investment, both the
structure and process, that management at NARF Alameda uses
as it functions within ACP.
B. STRUCTURE
The management control structure at NARF Alameda is that
of a responsibility structure. The principal method of
classifying data and management information is by depart-
ment. Responsibility costs are assigned as they are incurred
by or in behalf of the departments. Each department head
acts as a cost center manager and answers directly to the
Commanding Officer. NARF Alameda is a fourth echelon command
whose chain of command is shown in Figure A-3. The organiza-
tion structure of NARF Alameda is shown in Figure A-4.
C. PROCESS
1 . Program Selection
The objectives of the ACP program at NARF Alameda are
to: (1) equip construction facilities, (2) replace aged
equipment, (3) increase productivity through new technol-
ogy/ (4) support increased workload, and (5) meet safety and
environmental requirements [Ref. 23:pp. 2]. These objectives
parallel objectives set by the Naval Aviation Logistics
Center (NALC) who acts as the head of the Naval Air Rework
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Facility Activity Group. In this capacity NALC has the re-
sponsibility of formulating a five year comprehensive equip-
ment funding plan for all the NARF's [Ref. 22:pp 2]. It
accomplishes this through a NARF Modernization Program which
NALC sponsors and coordinates throughout the activity group.
This strategy is the basis for program selection at NARF
Alameda.
The actual process for program selection of produc-
tivity enhancing capital investments begins with a request
from any level of management at the NARF. These requests are
first sent to the production engineering department. At that
time an evaluation of the investment is performed and such
things as man-hour savings, compatibility to plant layout,
and environmental impact are considered. Investments that
will produce a cost savings after evaluation by the engineer-
ing department are then forwarded to the production steering
committee. This committee acts as a productivity enhancement
committee and evaluates the overall reasonableness of the
investment. The main criterion for program selection at this
point is whether the investment fits into the objectives and
budget limits of the NARF. If it does, then it becomes part
of a prioritized capital equipment budget, sanctioned by the
Commanding Officer, and submitted up the chain of command to




Each industrial funded activity group must prepare
and submit a Capital Equipment Budget (CEB) annually. The
purpose of this CEB is to present a proposed equipment
acquisition and funding plan for the budget year which is
divided into target obligations and target outlays (expen-
ses). The target obligations are for the equipments listed
in the activity group five year comprehensive funding plan.
The target outlays are those things which will affect cash
flow for the budget year and out years. They have an impact
on future depreciation costs, the acquisition financing
factor, and the computation of the stabilized rates. [Ref.
22:pp. 3]
NARF Alameda submits its annual CEB to NALC, who in
turn submits the comprehensive CEB for the activity group to
the Comptroller of the Navy (NAVCOMPT) . NARF Alameda's CEB
is a prioritized list based on forecasted funding. Budgeted
funding for equipment under the ACP program since its imple-
mentation at NARF Alameda has been between 1 percent to 2
percent of sales revenue. This is approximately $2 million
in FY 83 and $15 million in FY 85. Projected funding through




Productivity enhancing capital investment projects
adopted for use at NARF Alameda are assigned executive pro-
gram managers, normally one from NAVAIRSYSCOM and one from
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the NALC who follow its progress. In addition, a composite
project coordinator is named if the project can be used by
other activity groups, and a project managing agency is
selected. The latter is usually the activity where the
project originated and is responsible for data gathering.
Systems integrating contractors and technical consultants may
also be listed to provide additional expertise. The division
of primary responsibilities (i.e., project overview, tech-
nical review, and fiscal review) is normally divided between
the executive program managers and the managing agency.
[Ref. 24:pp. 11]
Each project is then given an event sequence that
details each phase of implementation. Expenditure tracking
schemes and payback measurements are also provided so that
needed data are gathered throughout the whole operating
process. [Ref. 24:pp. 17-19]
4. Reporting and Analysis
Most payback tracking and data information are based
on the master data record system of work sequencing presently
used at all NARF ' s . Information on each project is provided
quarterly to the project managing agency and the executive
program managers. [Ref. 24:pp. 20] In addition, as situ-
ations and needs change the CEB is updated and revised
throughout the year.
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In summary, the ACP program has given NARF Alameda a
detailed program for funding of capital investments. Func-
tioning within the MCS the ACP theoretically provides the
implementation process necessary for a successful produc-
tivity program through capital investments. However, impedi-
ments to productivity do exist within this system and are
evaluated in the next chapter.
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VI. IMPEDIMENTS TO THE PRODUCTIVITY PROGRAM
AT NARF ALAMEDA
A. INTRODUCTION
The Office of the Secretary of Defense stated that it
intended the ACP to provide greatly increased funds for
equipment acquisition at DoD industrially funded activities.
Associated with these additional revenues is a mandate to
enhance productivity through equipment modernization [Ref.
22:pp. 1] The MCS for the effective implementation of an
equipment modernization effort at NARF Alameda is discussed
in the previous chapter. The same four phases of MCS, that
is, program selection, budgeting, operating and measurement,
reporting and analysis, are used in this chapter to discuss
areas where possible impediments exist to the productivity
program at NARF Alameda.
B. PROGRAM SELECTION
Much of the program selection at NARF Alameda is received
from higher authority. These programs originate from staffs
and organizations outside the NARF line management chain who
are not directly responsible for managing and executing the
program [Ref. 25]. Though this is not necessarily an impedi-
ment, it does prescribe some limits on the flexibility of the
NARF management [Ref. 25].
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One of the impediments to productivity during this phase
of MCS is the method of screening programs. While ideas for
increased productivity through capital investment can origi-
nate at any level of the organization [Ref. 25], what matters
is if they end up in the equipment budget. Criteria for
being selected for this prioritized list not only include
whether or not the project is a cost saver, but also the
selected item must fit into the goals of production for that
fiscal year [Ref. 25]. Programs that would be excellent cost
savers in, for example, the administration department, would
be listed below programs viewed as critical in the production
divisions [Ref. 25]. Even from one production division to
another, those interviewed said they felt that there were
certain divisions which were much more priviledged in receiv-
ing funds than others. In those divisions where funding was
withheld, the supervisors stated they felt frustrated due to
the fact that they had to wait indefinitely on projects that
would be great productivity boosters in their shops [Ref.
25]. According to those same supervisors, it was doubtful
whether some of their projects would ever make it up the
priority list high enough to get funded [Ref. 25], While
those interviewed said they felt it unreasonable to assume
all cost saving projects should or will get funded, the idea




An impediment found initially to exist in this phase of
MCS was that funds generated did not fully finance capital
equipment budgeted for that fiscal year [Ref. 26]. Insuffi-
cient funds for use in capital investment was largely due
to the start up of the ACP program [Ref. 26]. Under ACP,
equipment for industrial funded activities would be pro-
cured from operating budgets rather than by use of appro-
priated funds. The cost of equipment purchased is to be
recovered through rates charged to industrial fund customers.
At NARF Alameda the budget amount is 1 percent to 2 percent
of sales revenues.
When NARF Alameda switched over to ACP in FY 83, it was
the opinion of one of the assistant comptrollers that the
budget analysts were not sufficiently prepared to deal with
the new program [Ref. 26]. Subsequently, in working with the
new rates and the factors that go into those rates, revenues
generated did not come close to budgeted amounts reserved for
capital expenditures. Less than $2 million in revenue was
realized for the approximately $8 million in the capital
equipment budget. Things improved but were not much better
in FY 84. It was not until FY 85 that revenues and budgets
for capital equipment were on track and meeting the expec-
tations of management. [Ref. 23:pp. 3]
Another impediment was the lack of knowledge of other
available funds. From 1 October 1982, when ACP began, until
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the summer of 1985, NARF Alameda relied solely on funding
productivity enhancing capital investments through ACP. This
was done because the original instruction (NAVCOMPTINST
7600.27) forbade the use of other funds. It stated:
The Industrial Fund Fast Payback program will cease on 30
September 1982. Participation by Industrial Funds in other
OSD or Service productivity investment programs not financ-
ed by Industrial Fund revenues will also cease on 30 Sep-
tember 1982. Equipment ordered in FY 1982 and prior years
through fast payback and other programs, will be accepted
on delivery and paid for as budgeted. [Ref. 22:pp. 4]
However, certain aspects of productivity investment programs
were not to be discontinued by industrial fund activities.
In a memorandum dated 24 March 1982 from the Assistant Sec-
retary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logis-
tics, the eligibility of projects from indistrially funded
activities for PIF funds was explained as follows:
In future years, projects at industrially funded activi-
ties will be eligible for PIF under the following special
conditions
:
a. Military Construction requirements for productivity
enhancing projects. (Selections will be based on the basis
of total project costs.)
b. Projects for major equipment in the Range and Test
Facilities Base.
c. Demonstration projects, prototype projects, multi-
function/multi-service projects or other exception projects
as jointly approved by ASD(C) and ASD(MRA&L)
.
d. Equipment for tenant activities, military support
functions and other activities of Industrial Funds even
though they utilize Industrial Fund financial systems.
[Ref. 27:pp. 3]
NARF Alameda did not receive word of this modification and
consequently did not submit any PIF projects. Information
about PIF eligibility was passed informally among the NARF
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comptrollers at a conference in summer of 1985. Currently
there are efforts underway to submit PIF projects. [Ref. 25]
Additionally, Navy Sponsored Productivity Investments
in Cost of Ownership Reduction Investment (COORI) are now
being utilized. COORI funds are refered to as Component
Sponsored Investments (CSI) funds in DoD instructions [Ref.
28:pp. 5]. COORI funds are used for investments in facili-
ties, equipment, procedures, and specific planning to
improve the operational capabilities of the fleet and its
supporting activities and to reduce the cost of ownership of
materials used therein. Projects have to satisfy a current
or anticipated Navy requirement for which new equipment,
procedures, or technology will provide increased product-
ivity. COORI projects are competitively selected throughout
the Navy. There are no specific qualification limits, but a
$3000 minimum and a $100,000 practical minimum are normally
observed on COORI projects. Projects should be amortized
within five years of installation.
D. OPERATING AND MEASUREMENT
In 1978, a conference on "Productivity and Work Motiva-
tion in the Navy and Other Military Services" listed lack of
adequate capital investment as one of the important impedi-
ments to productivity [Ref. 21:pp. 3]. At NARF Alameda 87
percent of those interviewed stated that the majority of the
more costly equiopment in their respective shops was between
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20 and 30 years old. When asked what factor would improve
productivity the most in their shops, 75 percent of those
interviewed said new equipment while 25 percent listed
training and supplies. All of those interviewed had equip-
ment identified for their shops that would reduce man-hours
and machine downtime which were their two greatest costs.
[Ref. 25]
Additionally, when asked what was done to improve produc-
tivity when needed to meet production deadlines, given new
equipment was not available, all stated that to remain within
budgets the first step usually taken was to seek a lowering
of standards. Standards are statements of the manner and
quality of the work being performed. This parallels a pre-
vious study which states:
Workers and foremen perceive standards as being too tight
because of the following reasons:
1. Components and aircraft entering NARF for repair
are in such poor condition that more time is required than
previously estimated to make repairs.
2. Much of the shop equipment is obsolete and in poor
condition.
3. Skill levels of production workers have declined,
and NARF training programs have not been adequate to com-
pensate for this decline.
Both workers and foremen perceive failure to meet pro-
duction standards as unacceptable performance. Rather than
report such failure, they take steps to evade the standard.
. . . The NARF management has been unbable to eliminate the
practice of evading standards without increasing the number
of support personnel and/or adversely affecting essential
production functions. [Ref. 21:pp. 42]
To design productivity into a system, such as the stand-
ards system, requires consideration of certain concepts. One
of these concepts is that production cannot be achieved at
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the cost of quality. It is a common error to maximize pro-
ductivity without at the same time maximizing quality. The
productivity attained with a loss of quality is not useful.
[Ref. 6:pp. 59]
With a projected workload increase of over 31 percent at
the NARF ' s during the next 10 years, operating with less than
adequate equipment could harply affect standards and produc-
tivity [Ref. 29:pp. 1].
E. REPORTING AND ANALYSIS
Capital equipment funding procedures, including justifi-
cation and economic analysis, must be adequately documented
at the activity level to ensure that post-investment apprai-
sal and audit can be performed [Ref. ll:pp. 4]. However, poor
implementation of standards at the NARF has resulted in
documented management and cost data being distorted. Such
practices as reporting jobs not actually performed and
transfering time from an efficient worker to an inefficient
worker are examples of past distortions. To the extent that
this distortion degrades management decision making, future
productivity will be impeded. [Ref. 21:pp. 42]
In summary, the management control system, though func-
tioning under ACP, has had several impediments to productiv-
ity and capital investment. The impediments listed in this
chapter may not be all the impediments to productivity at
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NARF Alameda, they are, however, the ones identified as part
of this research project.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
The productivity programs established by DoD and DON have
provided the strategy for the productivity programs at NAS
Alameda and NARF Alameda. The management control systems at
these two activities are the means by which this strategy is
implemented. In Chapters III and V these management control
systems for promoting and obtaining funds to improve produc-
tivity through capital investments are described. In Chap-
ters IV and VI the impediments to productivity found within
the management control systems at the two activities are
discussed. It is this aspect, the impediments to productiv-
ity that the following conclusions and recommendations are
directed.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The impediments to productivity listed in Chapter IV
which are found within the management control system at NAS
Alameda are:
(1) Lack of training in certain productivity programs.
(2) Absence of a productivity committee.
(3) Feeling of inadequacy in present budgets.
(4) Time lags between equipment requests and actual
procurement.
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(5) Program flexibility loss due to directives from
higher authority.
(6) Loss of expertise due to high personnel turnover.
Chapter VI listed the following impediments to
productivity within the management control system at NARF
Alameda:
(1) Program screening process.
(2) Insufficient funding during changeover to ACP.
(3) Lack of training in certain productivity programs.
(4) Lack of adequate capital investment.
(5) Poor implementation of standards.
It can be concluded that while these may not be all the
impediments to productivity at these activities, these lists
provide some areas where barriers to productivity exist. The
correction of these impediments will require coordination of
management from both within the organizations and up the
chain of command.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
The coordination of management from within and without
the organization can be demonstrated by the following two
recommendations. First, the formation of a committee to
analyze the impact of these impediments and suggest correc-
tive actions is recommended for both activities. Representa-
tives from each department on such a committee would improve
coordinationn of productivity efforts. According to manage-
ment theory, committees offer certain advantages. Among these
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advantages are: (1) committees tend to check more and reject
errors more often than individuals because of the greater
number of perspectives and inputs which they can muster, (2)
committee-member interactiion is capable of stimulating new
thoughts and ideas, (3) commitments to private prejudices may
be reduced, and (4) committees can change individual know-
ledge and skill through direct tuition, feedback, and model-
ing [Ref. 30:pp. 147]. The production steering committee at
NARF Alameda could easily function in this capacity. In the
case of NAS Alameda where there is an absence of a productiv-
ity committee, a new committee will need to be formed.
Second, an impediment common to both NAS Alameda and NARF
Alameda is the lack of training in certain productivity en-
hancement programs which make funds available for capital
investments. Training is part of the information flow in the
management control system [Ref. 10:pp. 27], Productivity
programs such as PECl/PIF were not very well understood and
rarely utilized. Some of the reasons why this is so surfaced
while interviewing at the activities. They were: (1) confu-
sion on eligibility for funds, (2) difficulty in properly
submitting funding requests, and (3) lack of awareness of the
program's existence. All these problems reflect a need for
additional training. [Ref. 31]
It is recommended that agencies in charge of these pro-
grams (e.g., for PECl/PIF the Defense Productivity Program
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Office (DPPO) ) evaluate their training programs or the train-
ing programs of the component services. Emphasis during the
evaluation should be placed on how far down the chain of com-
mand effective training is being accomplished, and then steps
should be taken to provide what is necessary so that adequate
training is received all the way down to the activity level.
In summary, the focus of this thesis has been an analysis
of the management control systems (MCS) as they relate to
productivity enhancing capital investments at NAS Alameda
and NARF Alameda. It was determined that impediments and
barriers existed that affected the successful implementation
of certain productivity programs within these two activities.
Solutions to these impediments can be found through a more
carefully coordinated, comprehensive effort from both with-
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